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PREFACE
Traditional objections to pornography were based on "Victorian priggish-
ness"' and the unease of proper society with explicit written description or
graphic displays of sex. During the twentieth century, Victorian standards of
propriety have been abandoned, and with them much censorship. The current
law of obscenity remains as a vestige of the thinking of an earlier era in which
certain "forms of speech and thought were supposed to be incompatible with
decent social community. ' '2
The sexual revolution of the last decade, however, has bred a new pornog-
raphy. Since "ordinary" sex is no longer a taboo subject, pornographers have
explored new avenues of prohibited behavior to titillate their readers and main-
tain profitable circulation of their publications. This recent trend in pornogra-
phy centers on the depiction of violence against women as an integral part of
sex-including bondage, beating, torture, and self-inflicted injury-and the use
of children as sex objects. In response to these trends, feminists have raised
questions about whether current pornography poses a threat to public safety.
They urge that the ever-increasing number of publications that equate sex with
violence molds readers' attitudes toward women and toward sex, and physi-
cally endangers women and children. Recognizing that the media have a mas-
sive impact on the thoughts and desires of consumers, feminists are concerned
that what is sold by the sex industry will be replicated in real life. Their aim is
not to suppress sexuality, but to prevent its dehumanization.
The purpose of this colloquium was two-fold: to expose the legal commu-
nity to the recent developments in pornography, and to familiarize feminists
with the protection afforded pornography by the first amendment. We hoped to
get the civil libertarians "unstuck" from addressing only the obsolete moralis-
tic objections to pornography, and also to discuss what legal remedies may be
available to women subjected to the dehumanization and the physical threats
posed by violent pornography.
The feminist speakers described pornography and its effects in graphic and
highly charged emotional terms. A slide show3 was presented, comprised of
photographs from fashion and pornography magazines, record album covers,
and billboards, which showed women and children abused, beaten, bound, and
tortured for the sexual titillation of consumers. One frightening spread from
Chic Magazine showed a series of pictures of a woman covered with blood,
masturbating with a knife. The title was "Columbine Cuts Up."' 4 Several
speakers reminded the audience of the movie "Snuff," in which women were
1. Panel Discussion: Regulation of Pornography [hereinafter cited as Regulation Panel], Audi-
ence Comment, at 298 infra.
2. Panel Discussion: Effects of Violent Pornography [hereinafter cited as Effects Panel], Open-
ing Statement of D. Richards, at 236 infra.
3. Hommel, Images of Women in Pornography and Media, at 207 infra.
4. Id. at 212 infra.
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supposedly tortured to death for the purpose of entertainment., Another
speaker described a case in which the gang rape of a young girl was found pre-
cisely to replicate a dramatization of a rape shown on television a few days
earlier.6
Phyllis Chesler expressed the sentiment of niany feminists when she de-
scribed her difficulty in "speaking about pornography in a reasonable tone. To
me," she said, "it is like a Jew discussing reasonably Hitler's Mein Kampf or a
black person talking reasonably about some Ku Klux Klan manifesto." ' 7 A sim-
ilar view was expressed by Larry Parrish, a Memphis attorney, who said:
I am finding it increasingly difficult to remain very cool and collected.
...Just recently, I met with a little girl who between the ages of three
and five had been sexually molested by her pedophiliac father.... What I
want to emphasize is that the pictures that you have seen on the screen
are not just isolated remote instances. We are talking about things that oc-
cur in Memphis, Tennessee.8
Andrea Dworkin spoke with rage of the failure of society to acknowledge
the atrocity of widespread violence against women. "A woman, nearly naked,
in a cell, chained, flesh ripped from the whip, breasts multilated by a knife: she
is entertainment, the boy-next-door's favorite fantasy, every man's precious
right, every woman's potential fate." 9
The feminist speakers sought advice from the civil liberties lawyers present
about what legal action might be taken to eliminate violence in pornography.
Leah Fritz insisted that "[t]he gentlemen who are lawyers must find a way to
protect my civil rights."' 0 The attorneys, however, interpreted the outcry
against violent pornography as a call for censorship, and most of their
discussion focused on defending the first amendment against this perceived as-
sault. Herald Price Fahringer conceded that violent pornography degrades
women, and said he finds it "personally distasteful."' 1 He urged, however,
that "[u]nder a democratic system it is imperative that all new and unconven-
tional ideas, no matter how offensive, be heard and read in order that we may
discover the few that may be truly enlightening."' 2 Professor Paul Chevigny
said he did not believe "the law has any right to control writings with respect
to emotions about sex. My reason is because I respect speech. I think speech
is effective. I think it does change people's minds." ' 13 He feared that the sup-
pression of any speech would impair "[t]he discussion of the meaning of rela-
tions between men and women.' 4 Other speakers went further, asserting that
5. E.g., Smith, Private Action Against Pornography: An Exercise of First Amendment Rights,
at 247 infra; Regulation Panel, Opening Statement of B. Feigen Fasteau, at 282 infra.
6. Brownmiller, Pornography and the First Amendment, at 256 infra.
7. Effects Panel, Opening Statement of P. Chesler, at 232 infra.
8. Parrish, Extemporaneous Remarks accompanying The 'Taken as a Whole' Standard to De-
termine the Obscene, at 259 infra.
9. Dworkin, supra note 5 at 216.
10. Effects Panel, Opening Statement of L. Fritz, at 238 infra.
11. Fahringer, If the Trumpet Sounds an Uncertain Note .... at 251 infra.
12. Id. at 252 infra.
13. Effects Panel, Opening Statement of P. Chevigny, at 233 infra.
14. Id. at 234 infra.
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pornography was protected by the first amendment because of its social value.
"Pornography," said Professor David Richards, "communicates a certain vi-
sion of sexuality... which is not rigidly marital or procreational.... I frankly
do not see how mere offense at content is enough to permit its prohibition." Is
Many of the civil libertarians seemed to believe that protection of first
amendment rights forbids creation of a remedy for those possibly injured by
pornography. They addressed the issue of government censorship, and criti-
cized current standards for deciding what may be censored, but bypassed con-
sideration of other avenues of relief. A few speakers discussed remedies short
of censorship, suggesting possibilities of government regulation and actions
which could be taken by private groups that would be consistent with the first
amendment. Marjorie Smith urged that private action by groups opposed to
violent pornography, including picketing, boycotting, and leafletting, was a per-
missible exercise of first amendment rights. Smith noted, "I think the ACLU
would say that to the extent that the group seeks the removal of material to
which members of the public may wish access, their activities are question-
able. ' 16 Smith disagreed with this view, urging that the first amendment
banned only governmental action seeking to limit speech. Private action, she
said, does not violate the Constitution even if its "effect would be to diminish
the diversity of expression in the community." 17 "Those who direct their boy-
cott at media advertising are acknowledging the power of ideas and expression
to influence action. They are taking ideas seriously, a result which can hardly
be deplored by civil libertarians." 18
Current Supreme Court standards, under which each community may
make its own determination of what is obscene, were much criticized. The
community standards rule creates administrative difficulties for magazines
which are distributed nationwide. 1 9 Marshall Berger advocated the establish-
ment of "a minimum standard that no state can tamper with, a standard upon
which publishers can rely when publishing something which will be distributed
coast-to-coast." ' 20 Brenda Feigen Fasteau suggested that if we are to have com-
munity standards of what is obscene, they should be set by women, since they
comprise the "community" most affronted by pornography.
2 1
Several participants believed that certain pornography falls outside the pro-
tection of the first amendment, and may be regulated. According to Ephraim
London, it would be permissible to "draft an ordinance which would prohibit
the display of offensive material to people who did not want to see it."22
Feigen Fasteau favored expanding the unwilling audience exception to ban
displays of pornography which are "against the will" of the viewer.2 She also
15. Id., Opening Statement of D. Richards, at 236-37 infra.
16. Smith, supra note 5, at 248 infra.
17. Id. at 249.
18. Id. at 250 infra.
19. Regulation Panel, Statement of B. Feigen Fasteau, at 294 infra.
20. Id., Opening Statement of M. Berger, at 281-82 infra.
21. Id., Opening Statement of B. Feigen Fasteau, at 283 infra.
22. Id., Opening Statement of E. London, at 285 infra.
23. Id., Opening Statement of B. Feigen Fasteau, at 283 infra.
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posited that a statute could be enacted that would prohibit incitement of vio-
lence against women. She thought it would be permissible to ban literature or
movies that describe in detail "how to rape a woman or how to violate a
woman.' '24 Such a statute, Feigen Fasteau noted, would not violate the first
amendment. 25
Other suggested remedies avoided first amendment problems by avoiding
censorship. Feigen Fasteau recommended extending the libel laws or creating a
new tort that would allow "a group of women injured both mentally and phys-
ically by a particular movie or magazine" to sue for damages. Plaintiffs might
be victims of crimes which replicated acts depicted in pornography magazines,
or persons mentally disturbed by public displays of violent pornography. 26
Paul Chevigny was doubtful about the likelihood that legal remedies cre-
ated to compensate women injured by pornography would be enforced to that
end. Recognizing that violent pornography is "bad for women," that it creates
"a degrading atmosphere," and that "specific connections [to criminal con-
duct] could probably be shown," Chevigny stressed that any censorship law
would inevitably be used against the very group it was intended to benefit. 27
"Censorship laws are always enforced on the side of the most powerful people
.... If you are an oppressed class in society, the last thing you want are laws
controlling speech.' '28
Perhaps the most telling occurrences at the colloquium were the things that
did not happen. Although some speakers bridged the gap between the feminists
and the civil libertarians, there was a general failure of communication. The
lawyers spoke legalese; the feminists spoke feminese. In addition to their non-
intersecting dialects, the speakers in the two groups tended to address different
issues. The lawyers defended free speech, seeming not to understand that the
feminists had come for help. Even those attorneys who saw the importance of
the problem and the need for legal solutions had difficulty in pigeonholing the
injury, in identifying the applicable legal remedies. In part this difficulty
occurred because the "atrocities" were presented in a form not easily suscepti-
ble of legal packaging. Paul Chevigny articulated this problem, saying, "I
thought we were going to hear about effects of pornography. I did not hear
anything about specific effects. Not a syllable."2 9
The feminists described the evils of violent pornography in subjective,
emotional terms. They were oblivious to the need for specificity, proof of in-
jury, or "hard evidence." (One feminist even suggested that the demands for
empirical information in the form of "hard evidence" was a Freudian slip, an
assertion of masculinity.) 30
This colloquium was the beginning of a dialogue. The failure of the femi-
nists to produce whatever "proof" exists that pornography triggers acts of vio-
24. Id., Statement of B. Feigen Fasteau, at 300 infra.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Effects Panel, Opening Statement of P. Chevigny, at 233 infra.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id., Statement of A. Dworkin, at 238 infra.
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lence against women, and the failure of the lawyers to produce fully developed
legal solutions to this problem, are consequences of the newness of the dis-
cussion. Bert Pogrebin, an attorney in the audience, suggested that legal think-
ing in this area must change before this problem can be solved. He observed
that "[w]e want a society that provides for the free and robust exchange of
ideas .... Some of us have only recently come to the realization that we also
want a society free from the kind of statistics [relating to violence against
women] that have been quoted today .... Part of our problem is that most of
us have paid little attention to the societal interests represented by these statis-
tics. Once we accept these values as perhaps of equal interest, then the prob-
lem becomes one of reconciling these values to create a society that reflects
both interests as best it can."231
LISA LERMAN
31. Regulation Panel, Audience Comment, at 297-98 infra.
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